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Abstract
American educational curricular policy defines knowledge in an unfortunately
narrow way. Specifically, it favors theoretical knowledge that is both appropriate for
college bound students and is easy to assess by mass distributed standardized tests. But
there are many domains of knowledge which, when implemented into the curriculum,
serve equally well to prepare students for life after schooling. In this paper I construct a
logical space for discussing knowledge in an educational institution that is not so narrow.
I divide knowledge into two main categories, virtues and techne. The domain of virtues
contain contains two additional categories, virtues of character and epistemic virtues.
The domain of techne contains both theoretical knowledge and productive knowledge. I
then explain what types of knowledge properly belong in which domain and argue that
any student that graduates from high school fully with a deficiency in one or more
domain has been improperly prepared for life after school, regardless of the postschooling path he or she chooses.
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Introduction
In 1983 a report entitled “A Nation at Risk”, commissioned by President Ronald
Reagan’s Secretary of Education T.H. Bell, and published as an open letter to the
President and the public, declared that the education system in America was in dire need
of reform. The report included an emotionally charged introduction that postulated the
eroding of the educational foundations of society by a “rising tide of mediocrity that
threatens our very futures as a Nation and a People” and suggested that “if an unfriendly
foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational
performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war”
(Commission on Excellence in Education). Though the foundations of standards based
educational reform had begun to be laid at the turn of the 20th century, “A Nation at Risk”
would give rise to a sense of urgency that would lead to the authorization of the “No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001”, which would mark the largest federal intrusion into
American Education Policy in history. 1
Indeed there is a crisis in American education, but it is not the crisis that “A
Nation at Risk” identified. It is a crisis of test dependency which, unfortunately, was
greatly exacerbated by the publication of this report and the legislative actions that would
quickly follow. At face value, it is easy to see why standardized testing seems valuable.
The easiest way to assess whether a broken system is improving is to look at the
numbers. Numbers are highly illustrative, easy to understand, and accountability can be
more easily determined through the study of quantitative data that it can through other,
more qualitative assessments. But there are limits to the types of knowledge that can be

1

For a more detailed history of the rise of standards based reform see Ormsby, Justin T. To Test or not to
Test: Standardized Testing in Music. Springfield, MO: Missouri State University, 2015.
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easily tested. Multiple choice testing can easily determine if a student has accurately
memorized facts such as dates, or even methods such as mathematical conventions, but it
cannot so easily measure a student’s creativity, aesthetic astuteness, or kindness. Were
these standardized tests merely a part of a larger, more thorough system of assessment,
then perhaps they would not be problematic. But standardized testing has become the
definitive method of assessing student performance, and thus, the performance of
teachers and school districts as a whole. Teacher retention, pay, and school funding have
become tied to quantitative assessments and so, naturally, promoting this limited view of
knowledge has become highly desirable.
2009 saw the development of the Common Core State Standards Initiative.
Without addressing any of the problems that came from No Child Left Behind, Common
Core created a new problem by, again, defining knowledge in too narrow a way, this time
by placing heavy emphasis on college preparatory learning via a standardized curriculum
designed for all students nationwide. Certainly, setting the academic bar high seems the
intuitive way to ensure that no student is cheated out of a quality education. While
college preparatory knowledge of the type best assessed by standardized tests is
important, it is not wholly important. To define knowledge simply as the memorization
of rote fact does not do justice to the complexity of the term and an education policy
which focuses only (or even strongly) on this definition of knowledge fails to provide
students with the complex matrix of skills that will be necessary for success after
graduation. In this paper I expand this limited definition of knowledge by presenting two
categories of knowledge each of which is divided into two subcategories. The first,
virtues, represents those types of knowledge which are good for all students, which must
6

be habituated and not taught, and which are identified by their occupation of a mean
between corresponding vices of excess and deficiency. Because of the universal
application of virtues, these types of knowledge should be considered in all classes for all
students. Virtues are then divided into two subcategories of knowledge; practical
knowledge (or character virtues) and epistemic virtues which themselves are not a type of
knowledge but are present in those who acquire knowledge most successfully. The
second category, techne, represents the types of knowledge that are good for students by
way of their intended post-schooling destinations and are taught and not habituated.
Techne is then divided into theoretical knowledge which includes knowledge about how
the world is, and productive knowledge 2, or knowledge about how to produce a good or
service. Because techne is good for students only in relation to their intended destination,
these skills should be mandatory instruction only in selective instances.
I argue here that all four of these categories of knowledge are necessary to
student success because any student who has a deficiency in one or more of these types of
knowledge will be poorly prepared for life after schooling. First, I further explain a good
in terms of one’s role in society. Then I introduce the four categories of knowledge
beginning with the virtues followed by the techne. Finally, I conclude that each of these
types of knowledge is important for student success because a deficiency in any category
leads to poor post-schooling preparedness, even when students show strengths in the
other categories.
It is important here to note that my intent is to set up a logical space within which
“knowledge” can be discussed in a useful way within the context of an educational
2

Aristotle calls this “craft”
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institution. I believe that the four domains described in this paper make for worthy
candidates for expanding a functional definition of knowledge. I consider all four
domains to be necessary conditions for producing well prepared students. I do not,
however, consider these domains to be sufficient for success. There are additional
domains of knowledge which are worthy of discussion. I withhold possibility that the
four domains in which I’ve described may deserve to be divided further into additional
and more descriptive domains. My general thesis here is to show that the way knowledge
is currently being discussed within an educational context is to too narrow and thus
insufficient for describing the adequate preparation of graduating students. Further study
should be done to so examine other potential categories of knowledge.

Good in Virtue of Role in Society
Aristotle considers the successful exercise of reason to be the greatest good for
humans because it leads to flourishing universally across the species regardless of class,
role in society, race etc. It is the type of good by which all humans who seek it are
benefited. But humans seem to possess a diversity which, for example, tomato plants do
not possess. For a tomato plant to flourish all that is required is the production of
tomatoes. In this way the greatest good for tomato plants, producing tomatoes, is the
only good necessary for the tomato plant. But the complex nature of human society
requires far more variation in the individual role in society of the members of the species.
Certainly individual humans may flourish best when exercising reasoning but species
survival, or at least flourishing, seems dependent on the successful exercise of good in
virtue of an individual’s role in that society. Doctors, for example, need not only to
exercise reason in a virtuous sense, but must also possess the practical knowledge
8

necessary to practice medicine successfully. So too with teachers, lawyers, cooks,
carpenters, musicians, and any other specific role a human may have within society. As
humans, unlike tomato plants, are strongly dependent on each other for survival, the
functional good of doctors and teachers benefit not only the doctors and teachers, but all
of those who rely on them for medical and educational needs.
In this way a carpenters and musicians share a common universal good -- that
which is afforded to them by their membership in the same species, but they also possess
widely varying goods by virtue of their role in society. A carpenter may be a good
human but a horrible carpenter if he possesses the universal good afforded him by species
membership but not the good by virtue of his role as a carpenter. Likewise, he may be a
great carpenter but poor human if he possesses good in virtue of role in society but not in
virtue of his humanness. In either case when a human suffers an imbalance between
these types of good, it is fair to say that in some sense he is not able to maximize his
capacity to flourish. Furthermore,f it is pertinent to question whether a carpenter who
expresses this imbalance can flourish even in his craft. An excellent craftsman will
undoubtedly be employed infrequently if potential clients admire his work but consider
him to be a cheat or a liar.
The divide between the carpenter and the musician is yet to be too narrow to
accurately account for flourishing in humans. All musicians can share a common good
by virtue of their role as musicians but may still require vastly different skills in order to
perform their role successfully. For example, a pianist and a trombonist both share the
role of playing music excellently. Furthermore the requirements for excellence in this
role are often similar. Both the pianist and trombonist should possess a high degree of
9

musical literacy, have knowledge of historical and modern performance practices, desire
to work hard to perfect their craft, etc. Yet the pianist requires a specific skill, namely
finger dexterity, that the trombonist does not require and the same holds true in reverse
(the trombonist needs well developed breath control while the pianist does not).
The diversity of goods by which humans flourish should be of particular note to
the educator whose job it is to ensure that her students leave prepared for whatever awaits
them. Were the educator like the botanist the tasks of preparation would be simple. To
prepare tomato plants for success is to cater only to a single good, but humans, as we
have seen, are much more complicated. Now the best of educators, who is perhaps given
a class of thirty students, needs to ensure that all thirty graduate the classroom prepared
for success as human beings, but also as potential musicians, carpenters, philosophers,
etc. Likewise the best administrators and counselors who are given a building with
hundreds of students need to recognize that each student’s needs differ from his neighbor
and must suggest coursework that is most beneficial for the student according to his or
her intended after-schooling destination.
One could object that this job is simpler than I here claim. For example, modern
educational reform suggests that all students should be prepared as if their intended
destination is University. 3 I argue that this simplistic positon ignores an importance of
the variance of roles within a society and is often detrimental to students who indeed do
not choose college as they suffer an opportunity cost in which they could have been
developing skills more appropriate to their future role. If the purpose of education is
3

Sheehy, Kelsey. "Use All 4 Years of High School to Prep for College." - This is an article published in US
News and World Report which intimates the attitude I have just described. This article is but an example
of a mindset that seems to be dominant in the current state of educational reform. Obviously, it is not
possible here to dive as deep into this claim as is deserved.
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success after schooling, and educators want to see their pupils flourish, then it becomes
inexcusable not to consider students as individuals with differing educational needs. If
this is too cumbersome a task 4 to be practical, then it is at least inexcusable not to
consider students in groups of a kind, with (for example) college bound academics in one,
artists in another, and vocationally bound students in a third. In the following sections I
suggest four categories of knowledge which, when considered together, maximize student
flourishing.

Categories of knowledge
In the following sections I propose two general categories of knowledge each of
which is subdivided into two additional subcategories. First, I will define virtues and
show how this category represents knowledge that is universally applicable to all
students, which must be habituated, and which is identified by being a mean between two
corresponding vices, one of excess, one of deficiency. The two subcategories of virtues
are practical knowledge, which accounts for the way people act and the attitudinal
dispositions they hold about their actions, and epistemic virtues which are themselves not
a type of knowledge but are present in those who best acquire knowledge. Second, I will
discuss techne. This category encompasses knowledge as it is more traditionally defined
and includes scientific knowledge – knowledge about the way the world is, and
productive knowledge – knowledge about how to produce a product or express a service.

4

I include this statement as a response to those who may object that individualizing education is simply
an impossible task. I do not agree with them however and hold strong to my belief that the best of
teachers do this regularly and effectively. Still, should the reader refuse to accept this claim then I offer a
second, though less desirable option, namely, considering students in groups of a kind.
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It is important to note that those philosophers who may have a strong familiarity
with Aristotle’s ethics will notice that in several cases I have chosen to use Aristotelian
vocabulary in a way that is inconsistent with what Aristotle himself had to say in these
matters. I have done so intentionally and for the following reasons. 1) Aristotle’s
language is illustrative and it is a detriment to replace it altogether, however, here I am
making an argument for the good of a particular group of humans, namely students,
which is distinct from Aristotle’s argument about good in virtue of species membership.
While Aristotle does show some concern about education, the complex American
educational system would have been quite foreign to him. In this way I apply general
Aristotelian language to a modern educational system which requires some alterations to
his original positions. 2) Some of the material that I cover here, especially epistemic
virtues, are conceptually new even within the field of epistemology and were never
considered by Aristotle. In this way it is fair to make a best effort to incorporate these
new ideas within the Aristotelian framework and not, rather, revise the entire schema. 3)
While I intend this paper to contain some philosophical depth, I wish it also, and perhaps
even more so, to be a useful scaffold by which professional educators and education
policy makers can construct an education curriculum that is more considerate of the
complicated needs of modern students. It is for this reason that I construct four broad
categories of knowledge that, I think, are approachable even to those who know little or
nothing of Aristotle’s works on the matter. Those philosophers who are more interested
in embracing the strictly Aristotelian concept of virtue would be best to consult the
Aristotle’s treatises on ethics or more modern works which specifically intend to clarify
or summarize Aristotle’s original positions. In the following sections I am careful to
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define all of the terms to make clear the ways in which I use them. In general, all terms
taken from Aristotle should not diverge so far from the source as to make them
incongruous, though there are differences, sometimes subtle, sometimes less so.

Virtues
When applied to education virtues represent the types of knowledge that are
universally applicable to all students, are habituated and not taught, and are identified by
existing as a means between to vices. The universal applicability of virtues render them
not only as useful to the Ivy League academic as they are to the mechanic, but also useful
in exactly the same way. Virtues then can be further subdivided into character virtues
and epistemic virtues where character virtues are those goods which are related to the
ways in which a person acts and the attitudinal dispositions one holds in regards to
actions and epistemic virtues are those goods which are present in those who acquire
knowledge excellently. Epistemic virtues may then by subdivided again into faculty
virtues and cognitive virtues though this division remains hotly debated by
epistemologists. 5
Virtues of Character – Practical Knowledge

Virtues of character are those virtues which, when exercised successfully, are
present in people who act appropriately and for the right reasons. In this way virtues of
character relate not only to one’s actions but also to one’s passions, for a truly virtuous
person will not only perform virtuous acts but will do so in a way that is not contrary to
his feelings. 6 In this way virtues of character can be thought of as practical knowledge.

5

Greco, John. "Virtue Epistemology." Section 3 paragragph 3

6

Andre, Claire, Michael J. Meyer, S J. Meyer, and Manual Velasquez. "Ethics and Virtue." Markula Center
for Applied Ethics. http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/ethicsandvirtue.html.
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They represent a type of knowledge because they are skills that are acquired by a person,
in this case by habituation, through experience. They are practical because they are
concerned with actual doings and not theoretical understandings. It is not enough, for
example, for a person to perform a virtuous action by accident or by luck. One must not
only do the right thing but must know that it is the right thing. Inversely one who knows
the right thing to do but abstains does not express virtue. In keeping with Aristotle I will
continue to refer to practical knowledge as virtues of character, but it is important to
remember that this type of virtue does indeed represent a type of knowledge as I have
previously described it.
Identifying an exhaustive list of virtues of character has proven problematic and
has been a matter of debate since Aristotle 7. Describing the criteria for a virtue is a more
simple exercise. Virtues of character, as previously mentioned, must be related to
actions, must be applicable to all students, and must exist at the median between two
corresponding vices. The first of these criterion criteria has already been outlined in the
preceding paragraphs. The second category will be briefly explained in the concluding
paragraphs of this section. The final criterion, that of existing in the median between two
vices, is where I now turn my attention.
To qualify for a virtue of character a candidate needs to be shown to exist in a
mean between two vices. 8 Courage is an often cited virtue of character and serves well to
illustrate this point.9 To express the virtue of courage one must know when courage is
warranted, act courageously in only those times, and do so for the right reasons. If one
7

BBC “Virtue Ethics”
Nichomachean Ethics 2.8 1108b12-13
9
Nichomachean Ethics 2.2 1104a20-25 – A brief representation of Aristotle’s position on courage
8
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were not to act when action is required by virtue then one is rightly called a coward. If
one acts when action is not required by virtue then one is rightly called rash. In this way
cowardice represents a vice of deficiency of action while rashness is a vice of excessive
action. Thus, one who rushes into a burning house to save a kitten is acting courageously
only if that action was appropriate given the circumstances. One who kicks down a door
to rescue a kitten when it is clear that the chances of success are slim is acting rashly.
One who refuses to rush in to save a kitten even though the likelihood of his success are
great expresses cowardice, that is, he refused to act when action was required. In this
way all virtues can be defined. What applies to courage, cowardice, and vice, applies
equally to modesty, shyness, and shamelessness and so too for any character trait that can
be labeled a virtue.
It is important to note that the term “median” is not synonymous with an
arithmetic mean. For given a line of potential actions with the most cowardice actions at
one end and the most rash at the other, courage may not occupy the place directly in the
center for any person and may in fact occupy a different position for different people. If
2 is too little and 6 is too much then it does not follow that 4 is appropriate.
For if ten pounds [of food], for instance, are a lot for someone to eat, and
two pounds a little, it does not follow that the trainer will prescribe six,
since this might also be either a little or a lot for the person who is to take
it – for Milo [the athlete] a little, but for the beginner in gymnastics a
lot… 10

10

Nichomachean Ethics 2.6 1106b2-5
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Were virtues of character to only regard actions then one might ask why
habituation is required. A rigorous series of punishments and rewards can certainly serve
to train a person to act in accordance with virtue 11 and this is a matter of conditioning and
not of habituation. A student, for example, who is spanked every time she lies is likely to
be conditioned to tell the truth. But, a virtuous person is not only the type of person that
acts appropriately but the type of person that takes joy in doing so. Consider the
following analogy. A man is given a choice between traveling to The Sudan to help the
poor or pursue his dream of being an actor. If this man chooses to aid the poor without
giving thought to following his dreams, then he is truly virtuous. But if he chooses to aid
the poor while inwardly regretful of his sacrifice, then he acts in accordance with virtue,
that is, he does the right thing, but does not possess virtue. 12 “To keep such destructive
inner forces at bay [the virtuous person needs] to develop the proper habits and emotional
responses…” 13 Humans can be conditioned to act in appropriate ways but proper
emotional responses to those actions need to be habituated, preferably from an early age.
“It is not unimportant, then, to acquire one sort of habit or another, right from our youth.
On the contrary, it is very important, indeed all-important.” 14
I should speak as to why virtues of character are applicable to every student.
Virtues, when properly understood, are universal goods and lead to flourishing in all who
possess them. The college bound student who cheats on a test will not flourish, for even

11

For more on this see “classical conditioning” – a common and unfortunate practice in education.
Hopefully the reader will see that conditioning behavior is not a substitute for habituating proper
character virtues.
12
This analogy was adapted from a podcast on virtue ethics delivered by Marianne Talbot of Oxford
University. At the time of this writing all of Talbot’s podcasts, including the one from which this analogy
was derived are available freely at: https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/people/marianne-talbot
13
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/
14
Nichomachean Ethics 2.1 1103b23-25
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if he is not caught cheating, his necessity to cheat likely indicates that he did not learn the
material for which he is now being tested. As an academic who holds knowledge as the
tool of his trade he has diminished his capacity to perform his role in society well. In the
same way a carpenter who possess adequate skill in the production of buildings but
cheats by introducing unsafe shortcuts in his work, will not flourish because even if he is
never found out the structural integrity of his buildings are degraded and his product less
desirable. He has expressed dishonesty, and his role as a carpenter is impaired by this
vice.
Finally, it might be objected that virtues of character are not the type of thing that
fall best into the domain of public education at all but are best left to parents, families,
churches, etc. The effectiveness of schooling relies on the successful exercise of these
virtues. If a student is given homework because the teacher believes that it will aid in
learning, then it is also necessary that he do the homework himself and not hand it over to
a friend or a parent. The benefit obtained from this homework, knowledge, relies heavily
on the exercise of honesty when completing this assignment. If the teacher must rely on
these virtues (and he must) then he must also be responsible for habituating them. If this
was not the case then it would seem unjust to punish students for their dishonesty since
the school had no hand in shaping their character. In the same way that it would seem to
be unjust to punish a student for poor performance on a math test when the math itself
was not taught at the school but expected to be brought in from home, it is equally
problematic to punish a student for dishonesty if the school has no role in the habituating
of moral virtues.

17

Virtues of character are well respected virtues globally. There are no functional
societies where honesty is viewed negatively, or even neutrally. Virtues of character are
not to be confused with religious doctrine which may be controversial. The virtue in
Christianity that says one should “honor no other god before me” is of a completely
different nature than a general virtue of character such as honesty, courage, and
generosity. In this way the shaping of moral character should not be controversial as they
neither conform to a specific religion nor are they opposed.
Epistemic Virtues

Epistemic virtues share with character virtues the properties of universal
applicability, habituation, and a mean between vices. They differ in that while character
virtues relate to the way in which a person acts, epistemic virtues relate to the way in
which a person thinks. Epistemic virtues do not represent a type of knowledge, but rather
represent the traits that, when present in a person, makes both possible and efficient the
acquisition of knowledge. “To say that someone knows is to say that his believing the
truth can be credited to him. It is to say that the person got things right due to his own
abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something
else.” 15 Epistemic virtues then, are those abilities that are present in the type of people
who acquire knowledge excellently. 16
Some virtue epistemologists have further divided epistemic virtues into faculty
virtues and trait virtues where faculty virtues represent faculties such as memory and
perception and trait virtues represent refined character traits such as open-mindedness

15

Greco, John. "Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.
For a non-Aristotelian perspective on the difference between knowledge and opinion see Plato’s
Republic or the Meno.
16
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and conscientiousness. 17 Epistemologists here often quibble with regard to which of
these subcategories should be prioritized or excluded. 18 But “it is not clear why
practitioners need to choose between faculty-virtues and trait-virtues. At first glance,
excellent perception, good memory, open-mindedness and humility all seem equally good
candidates to promote excellence or flourishing.” 19 If our focus is on education then this
is true. Both good vision and open-mindedness do seem to be good candidates for
promoting the acquisition of knowledge. Students then seem equally benefited from both
trait virtues and faculty virtues and it would be in error to exclude either.
I admit here that this subset of epistemic virtues fails to meet the habituation
requirement but I also maintain that they prove to be significant and it would not do to
exclude them all-together. One potential option would be to separate faculty virtues from
trait virtues and place faculty virtues under the category of techne which will be covered
in the sections that follow. This is however, inadequate for two reasons. First, techne
represent goods for students that are dependent on that student’s intended role in society.
Secondly, though faculty virtues seem different than trait virtues, they also seem closely
related in that both represent traits that, when possessed by a person, aid in the
acquisition of knowledge. Finally it doesn’t seem appropriate to remove habituation
from faculty virtues completely. One who possess certain perceptive faculties can learn
to use them more efficiently through habituation. A clear example might be found with
hearing. While those who are deaf cannot be brought to hear by habituation, those who
do hear can hone this faculty in a way that leads to a more efficient acquisition of

17

Greco, John. "Virtue Epistemology."
For more on this see virtue reliabilism vs/ virtue responsibilism
19
Greco, John. "Virtue Epistemology." section 3, para. 3.
18
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knowledge. 20 One might, for example, learn to recognize the most important parts of a
lecture that is delivered by audition and ignore sonic information that is unimportant. In
this way it is best to continue to place faculty virtues alongside trait virtues within the
category of epistemic virtues. 21
The presence of faculty virtues also causes problems for my assertion that all
virtues are to be found in a medium between corresponding vices of excess and
deficiency. Certainly the deficiency of good sight is blindness but there is no vice of
excess that corresponds to seeing too much, or seeing when seeing isn’t appropriate. But,
an argument can be made for faculty virtues existing as means in a similar way to that
which I have already proposed for habituation. For one who can see, then the virtue is
found when that sight is directed at the proper objects and by way of the proper
attitudinal disposition. The corresponding vices then are demonstrated when one cannot
focus at all (deficiency) and thereby misses seeing what is important, and when one
focuses on too much thereby not recognizing what is important. 22 Though these vices do
not seem to be easily named, perhaps something like “dullness” works for deficiency and
“distractibility” works for excess.
The corresponding vices as they relate to trait virtues are much easier to describe.
Open-mindedness then is a virtue because it falls as a mean between the vices of
stubbornness and gullibility where stubbornness describes the person who refuses to
consider new intellectual positions when appropriate and gullibility describes the person
20

This seems to be particularly so in the study of art where much attention is placed on learning to see
and hear the right things.
21
There seems to be a similar position in philosophy of perception where the concept of “ideal
perceivers” is important.
22
This poses a particular problem for those with ADHD or autism who can be overly stimulated by
perception.
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who considers these positions even when such consideration is not appropriate. Openmindedness can then be said to be expressed when a person who is presented with a new
position recognizes that it is worthy of consideration, considers it, and does so with the
proper attitudinal disposition.
Finally, epistemic virtues are universally applicable to all students in the same
way as character virtues. The academic who is presented with a new philosophical
theory is benefited from open-mindedness in the same way that a carpenter who is
presented with a new building technique. In each case, consideration of the new position,
when consideration is required, will lead to knowledge whereas the lack of proper
consideration will lead to a misunderstanding. The academic who is presented with a
new philosophical position, who then considers that position, will accept the new position
if it is better than his own, adapt his own position, or reject the new position after having
newly formed reasons to do so. One who fails to exercise open-mindedness will either
continue to accept his own position despite good reason to do otherwise, or accept the
other position even though good reason to do so is absent. Similarly the carpenter who
exercises open-mindedness about building techniques will either continue to exercise his
craft as he has always done because he’s found the new position to be inferior, adopt his
own techniques, or adopt the new technique because he has found it superior. Failure to
exercise open-mindedness will lead the carpenter to either continue to utilize his building
technique even though the new technique is better, or accept the new technique even
though his current technique is better.

21

Techne
The final two types of knowledge are both types of “techne” and represent a type
of knowledge which has distinctly different properties than virtues. First, techne are
learned and not habituated, and secondly, techne are applicable to students by way of
their intended role and not universally.
The two types of knowledge that fall under this category are theoretical
knowledge which includes knowledge about the way the world is and productive
knowledge which includes knowledge of how to make things. Productive knowledge
then includes those skills which lead to the production of an object, such as building a
table, as well as those skills which lead to the offering of a service, such as how to be a
doctor.
Theoretical Knowledge –

Theoretical knowledge concerns facts about the world as it is. Knowledge of the
motion of the planets qualifies as theoretical knowledge but so would the knowledge that
the American political system is a Democratic Republic. This knowledge is not eternal
for the fact that America is now a Democratic Republic does not indicate that it will
always be so, but it is so at present and thus represents the way the world is now.
Now, as I have argued knowledge that exists within the category of “techne” is
beneficial for students in relation to their intended post-schooling destinations. I do not
wish here to attempt to parse out what specific pieces of knowledge are important for
which groups of students. This is, in fact, an issue which deserves much discussion and
debate in the same way that creating an exhaustive list of character virtues does. Instead,
I define some criteria by which educators and education policy makers can make
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decisions about this issue. I do however, insist that the claim that every student need be
responsible for knowing that which is appropriate for strongly academic, pre-college
student is both nonsensical and harmful to students who will not find themselves in
Universities.
Certainly, some pieces of knowledge can be applicable to a large group of
students and still qualify as techne. For example the American political system is
intended to be participatory. Every graduating student, assuming they remain in this
country, are subject to the same laws and thus should have at least the knowledge 23 that
allows them to participate in the democratic process. In this way knowledge of the basic
structure and role of government bodies as well as knowledge about the voting process
are beneficial to all students. Certainly it could also be said that any student who
graduates from high school and does not know the shape and basic motion of the planets
has been in a very serious way, failed to be educated and I would agree that this also
constitutes a type of theoretical knowledge that is equally applicable to all students. But,
the fact that the moon is tidally locked to the Earth, an understanding of the intricacies of
cellular-biology, the atomic weight of noble gasses and so forth constitute a type of
theoretical knowledge that has some benefit for university bound students (and perhaps,
only for university bound students intending to study astronomy, biology, and chemistry
respectively) but not for those intending to pursue careers in a more vocational and less
academically intensive destination.
The line between what knowledge has universal benefit and what does not is
arbitrary and I don’t intend here to put forth a position places certain pieces of knowledge
23
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on one side of the divide. What I do suggest is that education policy makers and
professional educators should carefully consider in what ways knowledge is useful to a
student before mandating that knowledge be learned. It could be argued that all
knowledge can be life-enhancing, and to this I would not disagree. But clearly a student
can only be expected to learn a certain amount of knowledge. This is true in a life time
and especially true in the brief time one spends in the education system. Courses that are
required for students, then, should be structured in such a way as to maximize the types
of theoretical knowledge that are important to a student by virtue of intended role and any
courses that provide theoretical knowledge beyond what can be reasonably required from
a student by virtue of role should be, at best, electives. It is important here to place that
emphasis on “role” and this will help the educator decide between what knowledge is
life-enhancing but not necessary and what knowledge is absolutely essential for a student
to move on to an intended university, job, vocational school, or other destination.
Theoretical knowledge then clearly fits within the criteria I have proposed for
techne. It is taught and not habituated. One must be taught that the Earth revolves
around the sun. There is no way to attain this knowledge by habituation. It is beneficial
to students by virtue of their role and not universally as I have previously shown. I have
previously argued that knowledge of the basic political structure is applicable to a large
group of students but it is not universal in the way that kindness and courage are
universal. Courage is universally applicable to everyone regardless of role and knowledge
of political structure is only applicable to students by virtue of their role as citizens of a
country. Should a student leave the country after graduation kindness would be as
beneficial to him in Germany as it was in the United States, but his knowledge of the
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basic structure of the American government is no longer applicable in the same way it
had previously been.
Productive Knowledge –

Productive knowledge represents that type of knowledge that leads to the
production of a product or service. It is both a type of knowledge that is acquired through
teaching and is applicable to students only by virtue of their role. In the Nichomachean
Ethics Aristotle categorizes this type of knowledge as “craft” and defines it as follows:
“A craft, then, as we have said, is a state involving true reason concerned with
production. Lack of craft is the contrary state involving false reason and concerned with
production.” 24 Productive knowledge may lead to an oil painting it may also lead the
production of any tangible good or a service such as medical treatment. I have again,
broadened Aristotle’s original category but I maintain that his definition is still
applicable. Productive knowledge then is concerned not only with production but
production by way of reason. One may intuitively build a table, but one can be taught to
build a table excellently by appeal to reason. Similarly one might treat an illness by
accident but one who has acquired productive knowledge in the ways of medicine will
treat illnesses by way of reason excellently. One who does not know how to produce or
knows only how to produce badly is lacking this type of knowledge.
Before moving further it is perhaps beneficial to further distinguish productive
knowledge from theoretical knowledge as they are distinct but often related which may
be cause for confusion. As has been said, theoretical knowledge includes knowledge of
the world as it is, both as it has been always and will continue to be, that is, eternal truths,
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and how it is at the moment despite the fact that it may not always continue to be so. In
this way knowledge of numbers and basic mathematical principles constitute theoretical
knowledge. 2 + 2 has always, and will continue to always equal 4. It is an unchanging
fact regarding the nature of mathematical truths. In this way the basic principles of
mathematics constitute theoretical knowledge. Using numbers in such a way that allows
one to practice the profession of accounting successfully is however, a matter of practical
knowledge. Though it makes use of the basic principles of mathematics which constitute
theoretical knowledge, it does so in a way that leads to the successful exercise of a
service, namely, accounting. Similarly, rote facts concerning the shape and distance of
celestial bodies constitute theoretical knowledge while an understanding of how to use
those facts to land a rocket on the moon constitutes productive knowledge. In this way
theoretical knowledge indicates an understanding about what is while productive
knowledge indicates the ability to use this knowledge to produce a product or exercise a
service.
Here one might object that productive knowledge often requires practice in order
to produce a product or exercise a service successfully and thus productive knowledge
must also require habituation. I admit that further work needs to be done to disambiguate
these two terms. I here suggest only that “practice” is a repetitive exercise done in order
to better facilitate the successful exercise of an action while “habituate” is a repetitive
exercise done in order to develop the proper attitudinal dispositions towards that action.

Objections
Throughout the course of this paper I have argued that there are multiple domains
of knowledge in education, each of which is necessary for the production of highly
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prepared graduating students. Additionally I have argued that some domains of
knowledge are of greater importance for some students than for others. A future college
student might be best prepared for the future by attending classes that prioritize
theoretical knowledge. A future mechanic might be best prepared for the future by
attending more classes that focus on productive knowledge. It might then be argued that
what I’m advocating for is a system of educational tracking. In this way “tracking” is
defined as identifying a student’s aptitudes and forcing (or at least strongly
recommending) a specific educational track for that student based on her strengths and
weaknesses. I want to make it quite clear that not only is this not my intent, but that my
intent is actually contra to the idea of tracking. It should be noted that the curricular
policies in American education at present, especially post Common Core, constitute a
rather unorthodox tracking system in their own right. Rather than tracking specific
students into college preparatory courses and others into vocational studies, students are
all being tracked into a college preparatory career track. I am here suggesting that this
type of unidirectional tracking is a disservice to all students who will not attend college
after high school in that these students are being denied opportunities to attend classes
which better prepare them for their intended destinations. I do not argue that it is the
school district’s responsibility, teacher’s responsibility, or state or federal government’s
responsibility to identify which students should be placed into certain tracks and then
force a course of study upon them. In fact I am of the opinion that a student’s desires,
more so than his aptitude, should be the greatest factor in deciding which courses a
student should take. In this way I am pointing out a fact that mandatory college
preparatory curriculum ignores. It simply is the case that not all students will go to
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college. This fact has remained and will continue to always be true whether all students
are forced to study college preparatory material or not. For those students who do not
continue their formal education beyond high school, a mandatory college preparatory
education comes with a significant opportunity cost.
One might also object that a college preparatory education is the best possible
education for all students. One can never have too much knowledge and thus students
who possess strong theoretical knowledge beyond that which they might need in their
intended post-school destinations are potentially benefited from this higher degree of
understanding, or, at the very least, not harmed by it. This assertion of course ignores the
opportunity costs of which I have discussed in this paper. All things being equal a future
musician or mechanic with an understanding of physics or calculous may very well have
greater value than a musician or mechanic that does not. But employment of the ceteris
paribus clause here is inappropriate. I argue here that by allowing students with
vocationally oriented career paths to participate more frequently in courses that focus on
their area of emphasis rather than general academic courses like physics or calculous the
result will be students who have a greater understanding within their area of interest than
do students who participated in a broad college preparatory curriculum. I am simply
suggesting that for the future mechanic or musician, skills in car repair and music are
important and should be prioritized over a broader course of instruction that caters less to
the specific needs of the student.

Conclusion
Again, it is important to emphasize that my intent for this paper is only to set out
the logical space within which knowledge should be discussed in an educational context.
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I do not hope here to set out a strict rubric that suggests which courses should be offered
and to whom. What I do claim is that to take a narrow definition of “knowledge”, one
that includes primarily theoretical knowledge, is to ignore the complexity of the term in
such a way that is potentially harmful to students. In 2004 the American Diploma Project
issued the following statement. “No longer do students planning to go to work after high
school need a different and less rigorous curriculum than those planning to go to
college.” 25 Certainly I agree that rigor should be required of every student. But to
suggest that the types of knowledge that best prepare a future University student also best
prepare a future mechanic is not only nonsensical but potentially harmful for students that
will decide to pursue a more productive and less theoretical education. The unstated
implication here is that a strongly academic education is best for everyone. But this
accounts for only one type of knowledge and, I argue, that any student who is in
possession of one type of knowledge but deficient in any of the other three is not
adequately prepared for life after high school. In order to make more efficient curricula
that maximize preparedness for all students, the definition of knowledge needs to be
broadened and extended beyond strictly academic material. What I have proposed here
are four potential categories of knowledge that every prepared student must necessarily
possess. While I maintain the claim that a deficiency in any of these categories makes for
underprepared students I do not claim that these four categories constitute all types of
valuable knowledge. Continuing work should be done to better expand or refine these
categories but, in the meantime, professional educators and education policy makers must
make an attempt to consider all of the possible types of knowledge that are present in
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excellent students. To continue to write and enforce education policy without doing so is
not only negligence but unintentional malevolence.
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